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Abstract
Today’s success of state of the art methods for semantic
segmentation is driven by large datasets. Data is consid-
ered an important asset that needs to be protected, as the
collection and annotation of such datasets comes at signif-
icant efforts and associated costs. In addition, visual data
might contain private or sensitive information, that makes
it equally unsuited for public release. Unfortunately, recent
work on membership inference in the broader area of adver-
sarial machine learning and inference attacks on machine
learning models has shown that even black box classifiers
leak information on the dataset that they were trained on.
We present the first attacks and defenses for complex, state
of the art models for semantic segmentation. In order to mit-
igate the associated risks, we also study a series of defenses
against such membership inference attacks and find effec-
tive counter measures against the existing risks. Finally, we
extensively evaluate our attacks and defenses on a range of
relevant real-world datasets: Cityscapes, BDD100K, and
Mapillary Vistas.
1. Introduction
The availability of large datasets is playing a key role
in today’s state of the art computer vision methods rang-
ing from image classification (e.g. ImageNet [7]), over se-
mantic segmentation [6, 19, 33], to visual question answer-
ing [2]. Therefore, research and industry alike have recog-
nized the importance of large-scale datasets [7, 13, 29, 37]
to push performance of computer vision algorithms. How-
ever, data collection and in particular annotation and cura-
tion of large datasets comes at a substantial cost. There are
sizable efforts from the research community [6, 10, 33], and
also industry has picked up the task of collection (e.g. [19])
as well as providing annotation services such as Amazon
MTurk, which in turn can be monetized and constitutes im-
portant assets to companies.
Consequently, such assets need protection e.g. as part of
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Figure 1: We present the first study of membership infer-
ence attacks and defenses for black-box semantic segmenta-
tion models. For attacks, we propose a specific pipeline and
methods for semantic segmentation. For defenses, we show
feasible solutions from our systematic comparison study.
intellectual property and it should be controlled which parts
are made public (e.g. for research purposes) and which part
remain private. Based on these datasets, high performing
models are trained and then made public (e.g. as black box
models) via an API or as part of a product. One might as-
sume that the information of the training set remains con-
tained within the trained parameters of the model and there-
fore remains private. Beyond the aspect of intellectual prop-
erty, data might also include private information that were
captured as part of the data collection process, which are
sensitive and important for safe and clean services.
Unfortunately, recent work on membership inference at-
tacks [24, 25, 27] has shown that even a black box model
leaks information of the training data, aiming to infer if a
particular sample was used as part of the training data or
not. Such approaches have shown high success rates on a
range of classification tasks and have equally proven to be
hard to fully prevent (= defend). While this constitutes a
potential threat to the machine learning model, it can also
potentially be used as a forensics technique to detect a po-
tentially unauthorized use of data.
However, we are still missing even a basic understanding
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on if and how these membership attack vectors extend to se-
mantic segmentation, which is a basic computer vision task
and has broad applications [4, 12, 14, 15, 35]. Hence, we
propose and study first membership inference attacks and
defenses for semantic segmentation, as presented in Fig-
ure 1. To reach this goal, we design an attack pipeline based
on per-patch analysis, and discover (1) not all the areas of an
input are helpful to membership inference, (2) structural in-
formation itself leaks membership privacy and (3) effective
defense mechanisms exists that can reduce the effectiveness
of these attacks substantially. Accordingly, we highlight
our contributions to segmentation task and review relevant
work.
1.1. Contributions
Our main contributions are as follows. (1) We present
the first work on membership inference attacks against se-
mantic segmentation models under different data/model as-
sumptions. (2) We show structural outputs of segmenta-
tion have severe risks of leaking membership. Our pro-
posed structural loss maps achieve the best attack results.
(3) We present a range of defense methods to reduce mem-
bership leakage. In the end, we show feasible solutions to
protect against membership attacks. (4) Extensive compar-
isons and ablation studies are provided in order to shed light
on the core challenges of membership inference attacks for
semantic segmentation.
1.2. Related Work
Recent attacks against machine learning models have
drawn much attention to communities focusing on attacking
model functionality (e.g., adversarial attacks [9, 16, 17, 21,
28, 32]), or stealing functionality [22] or configurations [20]
of a model. In this paper, we detail the topics of data privacy
and security in the following.
Membership inference attack Membership inference at-
tacks have been successfully achieved in many problems
and domains, varying from biomedical data [3], locations
[23], purchasing records [25], and images [27].
It has been shown that machine learning models can
be attacked to infer the membership status of their train-
ing data. Shokri et al. [27] proposed membership infer-
ence attacks against classification models utilizing multi-
ple shadow models to mimic behaviors of the victim model.
Shadow models were trained by querying the victim model
using examples with higher confidences from the victim
model. Hence, a binary classifier was trained with infor-
mation from shadow models, and applied to attack the vic-
tim. Further, Salem et al. [25] demonstrated only one
shadow model is enough to reach similar results rather than
multiple shadow models. They also show that underly-
ing distributions of data used to train shadow models and
the victim can be different, which allows for attacks un-
der relaxed assumptions. In addition, learning free attacks
were proposed, which constitutes a low-skill attack with-
out knowledge about the model and data distribution pri-
ors. Salem et al. [25] proposed to directly set a threshold on
the confidence scores of predictions to recognize member-
ships. Sablayrolles et al. [24] set a threshold on loss values
and achieved quite successful results. While prior work has
only studied classification models so far, our contribution is
the first study of attacks and defenses on semantic segmen-
tation models. Although the segmentation problem can be
understood as pixel-wise classification, it turns out the de-
rived information is weak and needs to be aggregated over
a patch or even the full image for a successful attack. Be-
yond this, we propose the first dedicated attacks that fully
leverage the information of the full segmentation output and
hence lead to even stronger attack vectors.
Privacy-preserving machine learning The goal of these
techniques is to reduce information leakage during train-
ing with limited access to training data, which have been
applied to deep learning [1, 26]. Differential privacy [8]
allows learning the statistical properties of a dataset while
preserving the privacy of the individual data points in it.
Particularly, Nasr et al. [18] provided membership protec-
tion for a classifier by training a coupled attacker in an ad-
versary manner. Zhang et al. [34] obfuscated training data
before feeding them to the model training task, which hides
the statistical properties of an original dataset by adding ran-
dom noises or providing new samples. In our work, we
compare a series of defense approaches to mitigate mem-
bership leakage in semantic segmentation.
2. Attacks against Black-box Semantic Seg-
mentation Models
Membership inference is the task of inferring if a partic-
ular data point was part of the training data or not. Mem-
bership inference attacks against classification models ex-
ploit overfitting artifacts on training data [27]. Typical mod-
els tend to be overconfident on data points that were seen
during the training. Such overfitting issues lead to char-
acteristic patterns and distributions of confidence scores or
loss values which has facilitated membership inference at-
tacks. We show how such attacks can equally be con-
structed against models for semantic segmentation. While
such models can be understood as pixel-wise classification,
it turns out that the information that can be derived from a
single pixel is rather weak. Hence, we develop a method
that aggregates such information over patches and full im-
ages to arrive at stronger attacks. Finally, we show how the
full structure of the segmentation output can be leveraged
to perform attacks that even work on the final label map
without confidences – a setting where previous attacks on
classification models would completely fail.
We first describe our pipeline for attacking segmentation
models, and then present two attack settings exploited in
our study, which have different constraints during attacks.
Furthermore, we discuss our evaluation methodology, and
then show evaluation results.
2.1. Methods
Our approach infers membership information on a patch
level based on the output of the segmentation model, which
is then further aggregated to an image-level attack. In
this section, we explain how to train and utilize a shadow
model to train such an approach. Furthermore, several de-
sign choices concerning data representation and patch se-
lection are discussed that significantly contribute to the ef-
fectiveness of the attack. In the following, we assume a
victim semantic segmentation model V, and a test dataset
DV = DVin ∪DVout, comprised of data pairs used in training
DVin = {(Xi,Yi)}Mi=1 and others not used DVout.
Construction of shadow model S. In line with previous
work on membership inference, we construct a shadow
model S that is to some extend similar to the victim seg-
mentation model and therefore is expected to exhibit sim-
ilar behaviour and artifacts w.r.t. membership. The exact
assumptions of our knowledge on the victim model that in-
form the construction of the shadow model are detailed in
section 2.2. We prepare a dataset DS = DSin ∪DSout to train
S, which is a semantic segmentation model. S aims to cap-
ture semantic relations and dependencies between different
classes in structured outputs. S is used to provide training
data to the patch classifier with known membership labels.
Construction of per-patch attack AP. S provides training
examples for AP, since we have complete membership in-
formation of S. This allows us to train a binary classifier AP
for per-patch attack in order to predict if an example was in
the training data or not. Here, we apply a ResNet-50 [11]
to learn a classification model. It is able to captures local
In/Out patterns and summarize to a final output with global
average pooling at the end of ResNet-50. Besides, it also al-
lows us to interpret results with class activation maps [36],
which is different to the attacker for image classification
without any interpretations. We discuss different choices
for the representation used by this classifier next.
Construction of image-level attack A. In order to further
amplify the attack, we aggregate the information of the per-
patch attack on an image -level. For a given image, we crop
several patches, and feed them into AP to obtain classifi-
cation scores of them. Finally, our model for image-level
attack is calculated by
A =
1
N
N∑
i=1
AP(Xi,Yi), (1)
where (Xi , Yi) is the i-th patch of a testing image pair. We
discuss different selection strategies for the patches below.
Data representation. In line with prior work on member-
ship inference, we assume that we want to answer the mem-
bership query for a particular data point together with the
corresponding groundtruth. In our work, we present two
representations for training AP in below:
1. Concatenation. We concatenate the posteriors of a
structured prediction and its GT as the input of a binary
classifier. This allows the model to not only judge the score
and structure of the predictions, but also take into account
if the predictions represent correct or misclassifications.
2. Structured loss map. We compute a dense struc-
tured loss map from prediction posteriors and GT, and feed
the loss map as the input of a binary classifier. Previous
work [24] shows the success of applying a threshold on the
loss value of an image pair for image classification, and this
method can be easily applied to semantic segmentation. De-
spite this, we show keeping structures of loss maps is still
crucial to membership inference attacks for semantic seg-
mentation, and helps to achieve stronger attacks. Conse-
quently, a binary classifier is able to find some In/Out loss
patterns on a structured loss map.
Selection of patches. As our method is based on scor-
ing each patch with the per-patch attack, the selection of
patches plays an important role in obtaining stronger at-
tacks. Therefore, we study the influence of different patch
selection schemes with the following choices:
1. Sliding windows. We crop patches on a regular grid
with a fixed step size.
2. Random locations. We sample patches uniformly
across the image.
3. Random locations with rejection. We emphasize
the importance of different patches for recognizing mem-
bership is not alike, therefore, this scheme aims to reject
patches which do not contribute to final results or even pro-
vide misleading information. In our study, we observe the
patches with too strong confidences or too small loss should
be ommitted. For example, road area counts for most pix-
els of an image and are segmented very well, therefore, this
scheme tends not to utilize the center of a road, instead to
select its borders to other classes. Therefore, we propose to
sample random candidate locations and reject based on con-
fidence scores or loss value for these patches – depending
on the construction method of AP.
To conclude, we construct image-level membership in-
ference attacks according to per-patch attacks. This pipeline
allows us leveraging distinct patches for successful attacks.
Besides, our patch-based attack pipeline is flexible w.r.t.
image sizes and aspect ratios in case different image sizes
exist in a dataset, or even crossing multiple datasets.
2.2. Attack Settings
In our method, we train a shadow segmentation model S
and an attacker A for attacking a victim segmentation model
V. Our two attack settings differ in the knowledge on data
distribution and model selection for training V and S.
Data & model dependent attacks: This attack assumes
that the victims model can be queried at training time of
an attacker. Besides, this setting allows to train a shadow
model with the same architecture to the victim. Specifi-
cally, S and V have the same learning protocol and post-
processing techniques during inference. Further, this attack
assumes the data distributions of DV and DS are also iden-
tical, which comes from the same database. As a result, this
attacker is constructed with five steps: (1) Prepare data for
attack; (2) Query with a victim; (3) Rank with a criterion
(i.e., confidence scores, or loss value); (4) Train a shadow
model with top-ranked examples; (5) Train an binary clas-
sifier for attack, which may take different forms as an input.
Data & model independent attacks: For this attack, we
only know the victim model’s functionality and a defined la-
bel space. There is no query process for constructing train-
ing set for S, instead, S is able to be trained with a dataset
of different distribution, which leads to a cheaper and more
practical attack. Furthermore, the model configuration and
training protocol of the victim are unknown. The goal of the
shadow model is to capture the membership status for each
example, and provide training data for attack model A. Par-
ticularly, we highlight the severity of information leakage in
this simplified attack. Model and data distribution are com-
pletely different to victims, even there is no query process,
which might be detected on the server. In this setting, we
attack a victim model in three steps: (1) Prepare data for
attack; (2) Train a shadow model; (3) Train an attacker.
2.3. Evaluation Methodology
We evaluate the performance of membership inference
attacks with precision-recall curves and receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves. We regard the images used
during training as positive examples, and negatives if not.
Therefore, given a testing set with M image pairs used to
train a model and N pairs not used, random guess with
probability 0.5/0.5 for both classes is able to achieve pre-
cision MM+N and recall 0.5. We set different thresholds
in a classifier and compare its precision-recall curve to the
random guess performance, to observe if attacks are suc-
cessful. Similarly, we draw the random guess behavior in a
ROC curve, which is the diagonal of a plot. Furthermore,
to compare different attacks quantitatively, we apply maxi-
mum F-score ( 2·precison·recallprecison+recall ) in precision-recall curves and
AUC-score in ROC curves to evaluate attack performance.
Last, our method is based on per-patch attacks, therefore,
we employ the same metrics for per-patch evaluation, to
Table 1: Data and model descriptions of victim and shadow
models for independent attacks.
Dataset Model Backbone In / Out
Cityscapes (Victim) PSPNet [35]UperNet [31] ResNet-101 [11] 2975 / 500
BDD100K (Shadow)
Mapillary (Shadow)
Deeplab-v3+ [5]
DPC [4] Xception-71 [30]
4k / (3k+1k)
10k / (8k+2k)
help us understand and compare different attacks, as well
as defense methods in section 3, exhaustively.
2.4. Evaluation Results
Data and architectures. We conduct the experiments
on street scene semantic segmentation between various
datasets, including Cityscapes [6], BDD100K [33] and
Mapillary Vistas [19], which are captured in different coun-
tries under diverse weathers and image qualities, providing
multiple domains of street scenes. In addition, we apply
PSPNet [35], UperNet [31], Deeplab-v3+ [5] and DPC [4]
to train our segmentation models. For per-patch attackers,
we train a ResNet-50 [11] from scratch, allowing us to vi-
sualize the regions contributing to the recognition of mem-
bership for an example by class activation mapping [36]. In
details, we modify the ResNet-50 to downsample an input
by 8 in spatial, and feed a 90×90 input block into the at-
tacker, corresponding to 713×713 image patches. Finally,
we also compare our pipeline to previous attackers for clas-
sification models [24, 25], to demonstrate the effectiveness
of specific considerations for segmentation models.
Setup for data & model dependent attacks. For depen-
dent attacks, we conduct experiments with Cityscapes and
PSPNet (a.k.a. PSP−→PSP). We split Cityscapes into four
parts, i.e., DVin, DVout, DSin and DVout, where the sizes of
those sets are as follows: |DVin| =1488, |DVout| =912,
|DSin| =555 and |DSout| =520. We train a victim model from
ImageNet [7] pretrained models and lead to 59.88 mean
IoU (mIoU) for segmentation. For evaluation of per-patch
attacks, we sample 29760 patches from DVin and 30096
patches from DVout. Therefore, this setting leads to chance-
level accuracy of random guess for image-level and per-
patch attacks at the precision of 0.62 and 0.497 respectively.
Besides, the F-scores of random guess for image-level and
per-patch attacks are 0.5536 and 0.4985, which are drawn
as a reference in Figure 2.
Setup for data & model independent attacks. For inde-
pendent attacks, we employ different segmentation models
for a shadow model and a victim, as summarized in Ta-
ble 1. Particularly, BDD100K has completely compatible
label space to Cityscapes of 19 classes, but Mapillary Vis-
tas has 65 labels. To handle this situation, we pick up 25
classes from 65 classes, and set others as ignored regions.
Some conceptual similar classes are merged and then a label
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Figure 2: Evaluation of the importance of spatial structures for PSP−→PSP, starting from our final model (Size 90). The
first row draws precision-recall curves, and best F-scores are presented. The second row draws ROC curves, and AUC-scores
are presented.
Table 2: Label-ID transformations from Mapillary Vistas to
Cityscapes.
IDCity Class IDMV Class
0 Road 13, 24, 41 Road, Lane Marking - General,Manhole
1 Sidewalk 2, 15 Curb, Sidewalk
2 Building 17 Building
3 Wall 6 Wall
4 Fence 3 Fence
5 Pole 45, 47 Pole, Utility Pole
6 Traffic Light 48 Traffic Light
7 Traffic Sign 50 Traffic Sign (Front)
8 Vegetation 30 Vegetation
9 Terrain 29 Terrain
10 Sky 27 Sky
11 Person 19 Person
12 Rider 20, 21, 22 Bicyclist, Motorcyclist,Other Rider
13 Car 55 Car
14 Truck 61 Truck
15 Bus 54 Bus
16 Train 58 On Rails
17 Motorcycle 57 Motorcycle
18 Bicycle 52 Bicycle
space of 19 categories is created, which is compatible with
Cityscapes. Table 2 shows the details of our merged label
space. Pixels who do not appear in the third row of Table 2,
are set to ignored labels, which have a label value 255. For
victim models, we train a PSPNet and an UperNet using the
official split of Cityscapes, leading to 79.7 and 76.6 mIoU
for segmentation. For shadow models, we apply our splits
to balance the data used in training (In) and testing (Out) for
providing training data of a binary classifier. In the end, the
F-score of random guess for image-level independent attack
is 0.6313. We can compare this number to all the attackers
in Table 3, and observe the severe information leakage of
semantic segmentation models.
Results. Results of the different versions of our model as
well as comparision to previous work in presented in Ta-
ble 3. While previous work on membership inference tar-
gets classification models [25, 24], we facilitate a compari-
son to these approaches by extending them to the segmen-
tation scenario. [25] proposes a learning-based attacker and
a learning-free attacker. We train their learning-based at-
tacker with 1×1 vector inputs, and test on all pixel loca-
tions. Final image-level attacks are obtained by averaging
the binary classification scores of all locations. Similar to
our method, we test different settings, and it fails to achieve
attacks with the shadow model DPC [4] in Table 1. Be-
sides, we test their learning-free attacker by averaging the
confidence scores of all locations. Equally, we facilitate
a comparison to [24] where we use the loss map for the
segmentation output. For our methods, we report the num-
bers for last two patch selection strategies with sampling 10
patches. Besides, we also perform attacks with full image
inputs using our binary classifiers, which have a global aver-
age pooling in the end and are able to handle different sizes
of inputs. We emphasize that the ratio of In/Out testing ex-
amples are different for dependent and independent attacks,
therefore, the numbers between them cannot be compared.
We conclude that recent models for semantic segmentation
are susceptible to membership inference attacks with AUC
scores of the attacker up to 87.1 in the dependent and 94.9 in
the independent setting. Overall, we observe that our loss-
based method with rejection scheme performs best in most
settings and measures.
Importance of spatial structures. Key to strong member-
ship performance is exploiting the structural information of
the spatial output we observe from a segmentation model.
Hence, we conduct attacks with gradually reduced struc-
Table 3: Comparison of different attackers. We compare our attackers to previous methods, including the learning-based
attacker [25]∗ and learning-free attackers by applying a threshold on a confidence score [25]+ or a loss value [24].
Methods
Dependent Attacks Independent Attacks
PSP−→PSP Deeplab-v3+−→PSP Deeplab-v3+−→Uper DPC−→PSP DPC−→Uper
F-score (%) AUC (%) F-score (%) AUC (%) F-score (%) AUC (%) F-score (%) AUC (%) F-score (%) AUC (%)
Adapted Salem et al. [25]∗ 77.2 67.2 92.4 63.5 92.3 62.6 – – – –
Adapted Salem et al. [25]+ 77.4 62.0 92.3 63.4 92.3 59.2 92.3 63.4 92.3 59.2
Adapted Sablayrolles et al.[24] 82.2 74.9 94.4 81.4 93.0 72.4 94.4 81.4 93.0 72.4
Ours (C+GT, Full) 80.6 81.2 94.5 85.0 92.8 71.8 93.2 73.5 92.6 68.8
Ours (Loss, Full) 84.2 82.6 95.7 89.1 93.2 76.3 93.1 73.5 92.4 68.3
Ours (C+GT, Random) 83.4 82.7 95.0 86.1 95.4 88.5 92.9 74.9 94.4 85.5
Ours (Loss, Random) 84.8 84.6 95.7 90.8 95.8 94.3 94.0 77.7 93.3 79.4
Ours (C+GT, Rejection) 83.3 83.0 94.9 86.3 95.3 91.2 93.5 76.3 94.4 86.1
Ours (Loss, Rejection) 86.7 87.1 95.9 91.1 96.2 94.9 94.1 77.8 93.5 82.0
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Figure 3: Image-level comparison results w.r.t. patch selection and data representations, under varying patch numbers.
tural inputs in our dependent attacks in order to analyze
the importance of this structural information for our goal.
Our final model takes 90×90 blocks as inputs for per-patch
attackers. Therefore, we crop sub-blocks from our final
model with input sizes of 60, 45, 30, 15 for providing dif-
ferent level of structures. We compare the precision-recall
curves and ROC curves for per-patch as well as image-level
attacks in Figure 2. We note that all the feature vectors in
the blocks of different sizes have the same scale of receptive
fields. We apply the same architecture of per-patch attacker
for sizes 90-30, but modify the architecture for size 15, be-
cause its spatial size is too small. We train a ResNet-50
which downsamples 8× in spatial, and it performs better
than 8× downsampling for size 15. First, we compare the
per-patch attack performance, and are able to observe that
attacks become harder with decreasing patch sizes, where
smaller patches provide less structures. Second, we com-
pare image-level attacks for them, where random selection
strategy is applied to integrate all patches. We sample 5,
20, 20, 30, 30 random patches for size 90, 60, 45, 30, and
15 to integrate image-level results. Consequently, size 90
achieves the best performance, even though other attackers
obtain very close image-level results. Last, we highlight
that our concatenation-based attacker degenerates to previ-
ous work [25] with 1×1 vector inputs. We observe that 1×1
inputs keep this decreasing trend and achieve worse results
than size 15, which can be found in Table 3. From this re-
sults, we conclude that structures are of great importance in
membership inference attacks for semantic segmentation,
so that an attacker is able to mine some In/Out confidence
or loss patterns over an array input.
Analysis of patch selection and data representation. We
test our three sampling strategies and two representations as
depicted in section 2.1. Figure 3 plots the image-level com-
parison results. For sliding windows, we sample at least 6
patches to guarantee an entire image can be covered. For
random locations, we sample different numbers of patches
for image-level attacks to observe the influence of patch
numbers, starting from one patch. We conduct this experi-
ments for 3 times and report the mean. In summary, we ob-
serve these two strategies achieves comparable performance
when the same numbers of patches are used. Specifically,
sliding windows perform better on dependent attacks with
loss maps, and random locations are better for independent
attacks (Deeplab-v3+ −→PSP, and Deeplab-v3+ −→Uper),
which may be caused by inconsistent data distributions or
different behaviors of segmentation models. Last, we test
our random locations with rejection strategy. To avoid the
affect of random seeds, we sample the same locations to
previous random locations if a patch is not rejected. We
can see clear improvements if we sample very few patches,
whose results are sensitive to sampled locations. In street
scenes, road has a large portion of pixels, therefore, it tend
to sample a road patch, which has the highest accuracy over
all the classes and less discrimination for In/Out classifica-
tion. After ignoring those patches, performance is improved
because the rejection helps us avoid those less informative
patches. To conclude, not all the regions contribute to suc-
cessful attacks for segmentation, that we need a regime to
determine membership status of an image, instead of pro-
cessing the whole like previous work for classification.
Comparing our patch-based attacks to the full image at-
tacks, we realize using full images as inputs makes perfor-
mance significantly decreased, even though the same clas-
sifier is applied. The classification for full images may be
affected by misleading areas. Hence, partitioning an im-
age into many patches helps focus on local patterns and
makes a better decision. Besides, we observe that our re-
jection scheme achieves better performance than random
scheme, which further supports our argument on the differ-
ence between segmentation and classification. In addition,
our concatenation-based attacker outperforms [25], which
demonstrates the importance of spatial structures, similar to
Figure 2. From our results, [24] is able to obtain acceptable
performance but worse than our structured loss map-based
attackers, which hold the structural information. Finally,
our novel structured loss maps achieve better results than
concatenation and other methods [25, 24] in most cases.
3. Defenses
To mitigate the leakage of membership, we aim to re-
duce or hide overfitting artifacts of predictions. Therefore,
we study a range of defense methods to reduce the distribu-
tion gaps between training data and others w.r.t. confidence
scores of predictions or loss values, including Argmax,
Gauss, Dropout and DPSGD. The first two methods can be
applied in any segmentation models and last two can be ap-
plied in deep neural networks.
Settings. We analyze the performance of image-level at-
tacks according to random locations in this section, which
are easily compared to the results without defenses in Ta-
ble 3. We sample patches at the same locations for differ-
ent defenses, and keep consistent to previous attacks. Be-
cause Gaussian noises, or dropout will change output dis-
tributions, rejection scheme may sample different patches.
Therefore, we do not test our rejection scheme in this sec-
tion. We apply AUC-score to compare different meth-
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Figure 4: Performance comparison for Argmax defense.
ods, where random guess always has 0.5 AUC-score for all
the splits. Besides, for independent attacks, we report the
settings of Deeplab-v3+ −→PSP and Deeplab-v3+ −→Uper,
which have better attacks among all. Same to our attack pro-
tocol, our shadow and victim have the same post-processing
and learning protocol in dependent attacks. In other words,
we employ the same defense and strength factors on shadow
and victim models in this setting. In contrast, we apply de-
fenses on victim models only for independent attacks, be-
cause we do not have any knowledge of victims in this set-
ting. Last, an ideal defense is supposed to make attacks hard
and preserve segmentation utility at the same time. There-
fore, we jointly observe membership protection capability
and utility of segmentation, to compare different defense
methods and seek for a better solution.
3.1. Methods and results
Argmax. It only returns predicted labels instead of pos-
teriors for an image. We use one-hot vectors to complete
attacks for our methods and others [25, 24]. Obviously, pre-
vious learning-free attacker [25] based on confidence scores
fails to recognize membership states, because every exam-
ple has confidence 1. In Figure 4, we show the compari-
son results for all the other methods. Because argmax is
very easy to be noticed, we train binary classifiers for inde-
pendent attacks with argmax operation as well. In general,
argmax only reduces membership leakage in segmentation
models a little for all the attackers. A model already leaks
information when it only returns predicted labels. To con-
clude, we highlight the difference to protecting classifica-
tion, that argmax cannot successfully protect the member-
ship privacy for segmentation.
Gauss. To hide overfitting artifacts or patterns, we add
Gaussian noises on the posteriors with different variances,
varying from 0.01 to 0.1 with step 0.01 for independent at-
tacks. To further test the defense for dependent attacks, we
add very strong noises to variance 0.4. After noising, we
set the values into 0 in case they are smaller than 0, and
then normalize each location individually. Segmentation
performance is decreased with stronger noises, therefore,
we show the joint privacy-segmentation plots in Figure 5
to observe the defense behaviors as well as the maintained
utility of the segmentation method. First, we observe Gauss
protects PSPNet and UperNet in independent attacks suc-
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Figure 5: Joint plots for Gaussian noise defense .
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Figure 6: Joint plots for Dropout defense during test.
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Figure 7: Joint plots for DPSGD defense.
cessfully, which reduces AUC-scores from 0.9 to less than
0.6, while only losing 0.2 mIoU. Second, we observe our
loss-based attackers are more sensitive to Gaussian noises.
Despite stronger attacks of structured loss maps, they are
easier to protect with Gaussian noises. Finally, we realize
this defense is hard to mitigate leakage for dependent at-
tacks. Even though we employ very strong noises for this,
losing mIoU from 59.88 to 23.17, it still has more than 0.75
AUC-scores for both attacks. To conclude, Gauss is hard to
protect a model when the noises of the same distribution are
added to victim and shadow models, and binary classifiers
can pick useful information from noisy inputs.
Dropout. It is used to avoid overfitting in training a deep
neural networks, that we applied in training our victim
model with dropout ratio 0.1. However, it does not hide
membership from our studies in section 2. Therefore, we
enable dropout operation during testing to blur a predic-
tion. We realize a network still produces decent results
when we use a different dropout ratio. Hence, we apply
dropout ratio 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 to obfuscate a prediction at
different degrees. We show the joint plots in Figure 6. From
our study, we observe enabling dropout during test is able
to slightly mitigate membership leakage, but segmentation
performance decreases a lot when a large ratio is applied.
DPSGD. Differential Privacy SGD (DPSGD) [1] adds
Gaussian noises on the clipped gradients for individual ex-
amples of a training batch, in a way that the learnt param-
eters and hence all derived results such as predictions are
differentially private. As a result, the influence a single ad-
dition or removal of a training example can have is limited
and therefore should hamper membership inference. We ap-
ply DPSGD in our study to protect a model. Before train-
ing, we collect gradient statistics over entire training data
for different layers of a network, and set individual clipping
factors for all the layers. Similar to other defenses, we also
apply varying variances in Gaussian noises for DPSGD. We
train PSPNet with Gaussian variances 10-3, 4×10-3 for de-
pendent settings, and variances 10-3, 4×10-3, 8×10-3 for in-
dependent settings. For UperNet, we train with 10-6, 10-3,
3×10-3, 6×10-3. We show the joint plots in Figure 7, and
observe that DPSGD successfully protect memberships in
all the settings. Particularly, even we employ noises of 1e-
6 for three segmentation models, they only reduce 1.12,
1.36 and 0.75 mIoU, while preventing leakage significantly.
Therefore, we recommend DPSGD to train a segmentation
model for protecting membership privacy in practise.
Summary of defenses. In spite of the success of member-
ship inference under various settings, we point out feasible
solutions which can significantly reduce the risk of infor-
mation leakage. (1) Adding Gaussian noises helps prevent
leakage under independent settings from unknown attack-
ers, which is quite simple and able to directly apply for an
existing model without further costs. (2) For deep neural
networks, we suggest applying DPSGD to train a model,
which successfully mitigates the leakage for all three at-
tacks, with limited model degeneration, even though it adds
Gaussian noises on the gradients during training and hence
requires increased training time.
3.2. Interpretability
One of difference from attacking segmentation to classi-
fication is on the input form, which can be regarded as an
image. Therefore, our method can provide interpretations
for different examples, indicating important regions for rec-
ognizing membership status. Besides, interpretations also
help us to understand and compare different defenses. We
apply class activation maps (CAMs) [36] to highlight the
areas that help to detect examples/patches from training set
in Figure 8. Besides, we also compare the activation areas
before and after defenses with structured loss maps.
First, we observe our attacker is able to mine some re-
gions with specific objects or intersections between two
classes, even our attacker has no interaction with a victim.
Second, we compare the attacker’s different behaviors for
those defenses. We can see argmax can simply change the
CAM to different intensities, but still hold the major lay-
out of the original CAM. For Gaussian noises, we employ
variance 0.1 here, and can apparently observe noises on the
structural loss map for all the pixel locations, therefore, it
makes all the examples have a similar CAM, that strong ac-
tivations form a rough circle for different examples. For
dropout, it will change structured loss maps in many places
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Figure 8: Class activation maps (CAMs) and structured loss
maps (SLMs) for independent attack Deeplab-v3+ −→Uper.
and then change the CAM. In particular, it changes the loca-
tions with strong loss values more than others. For DPSGD,
we can see it has very similar loss maps to the original
model. The only differences are on some regions hard to
segment. Even DPSGD changes the loss maps a little, the
final CAMs are able to change a lot for some examples,
therefore, it helps defend stealing memberships while pre-
serving segmentation performance very well.
4. Conclusion
We have provided the first membership inference at-
tacks and defenses for semantic segmentation models by
extending previous membership attacker for classification
and proposing a new specific representation (i.e., structured
loss maps). Our study is conducted under two different set-
tings with various model/data assumptions. We show that
spatial structures are important to achieve successful attacks
for segmentation, and our structured loss maps achieve the
best results among all. Besides, we study defense methods
to reduce membership leakage and provide safe segmenta-
tion. As a result, we suggest to add Gaussian noises on the
posteriors in inference, or apply differential privacy SGD
to train a model. We hope that our work contributes to the
awareness of novel threats that modern deep learning mod-
els pose – such as leakage of information on the training
data. Our contributions shows that such threats can be miti-
gated with little impact on the utility of the overall model.
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